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UNITED STATES v. MEHANNA, THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT, AND MATERIAL SUPPORT IN 
THE WAR ON TERROR 
Abstract: This Note examines the recent conviction of U.S. citizen Tarek 
Mehanna for providing material support for terrorism. Mehanna was con-
victed of providing material support for terrorism not because he posed an 
immediate threat, but rather because he translated al Qaeda propaganda 
into English. This Note argues that the 2010 U.S. Supreme Court case 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project provides inadequate guidance for when 
speech made in support of terror is punishable, and that the Court’s def-
erence to the political branches will have a deleterious impact on free 
speech rights. This Note further argues that speech like Mehanna’s should 
be evaluated using an incitement standard developed specifically for mate-
rial support cases. This proposed standard will allow courts to strike a 
proper balance between free speech rights and national security. 
Introduction 
 On December 20, 2011, after a closely scrutinized trial, a jury con-
victed U.S. citizen Tarek Mehanna on charges of providing material 
support and of attempting to provide material support to al Qaeda.1 
The verdict followed the presentation of evidence that Mehanna sup-
ported al Qaeda and a finding that he had previously sought paramili-
tary training in Yemen.2 The trial was closely scrutinized in large part 
because the centerpiece of the government’s case against Mehanna was 
his translation and dissemination of al Qaeda propaganda over the In-
ternet.3 The government presented no evidence that Mehanna posed 
                                                                                                                      
1 David Boeri, Mehanna Found Guilty in Terrorism Trial, WBUR.org (Dec. 21, 2011), 
http://www.wbur.org/2011/12/21/mehanna-verdict; Jennifer Rowland, The LWOT: Tarek 
Mehanna Convicted on All Charges, Foreign Policy (Jan. 3, 2012), http://www.foreignpolicy. 
com/articles/2012/01/03/the_lwot_tarek_mehanna_convicted_on_all_charges. 
2 Boeri, supra note 1. The government claimed that Mehanna went to Yemen with two 
friends to receive training at a camp run by terrorists, but that he returned within two 
weeks because he was not able to find any such camps. George D. Brown, Notes on a Terror-
ism Trial—Preventive Prosecution, “Material Support” and the Role of the Judge After United States 
v. Mehanna, 4 Harv. Nat’l Sec. J. 1, 11 (2012). 
3 Second Superseding Indictment at 6, 8, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-CR-10017-
GAO (D. Mass. 2011); George Brown, Op-Ed., Anti-terror Fight on Trial, Bos. Herald, Nov. 2, 
2011, http://bostonherald.com/news/opinion/op_ed/view/2011_1102anti-terror_fight_on_ 
trial. 
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an imminent threat of violence, or that he had direct contact with 
members of al Qaeda.4 Nevertheless, Mehanna’s translations contrib-
uted to his sentence of more than seventeen years in prison.5 
 Mehanna’s case involves multiple issues of key importance for the 
future of free speech rights in the War on Terror.6 From the govern-
ment’s perspective, speech made in support of terrorists can be a valu-
able contribution to the nation’s enemies.7 Furthermore, speech made 
in support of terror can evidence a likelihood of committing future 
terror attacks, which is an important consideration in the government’s 
preemptive battle against terrorists.8 On the other hand, it is also cru-
cial that civil liberties, such as the right to free speech, are upheld in 
times of crisis.9 This is especially true with regards to the War on Terror, 
which is uncertain in duration and scope.10 Courts today must deal with 
a traditional wartime conundrum: how to balance deference to the 
government’s expertise in defending the nation with the protection of 
civil liberties, even though such protection may make the government’s 
war effort less effective.11 
                                                                                                                      
4 Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 3, at 6–7; David Boeri, Jury Selection Be-
gins for Sudbury Man Accused of Plotting Terrorist Attacks, WBUR.org (Oct. 24, 2011), http:// 
www.wbur.org/2011/10/24/mehanna-set-up. 
5 Milton J. Valencia, Mehanna Gets More Than 17 Years in Jail, Bos. Globe, Apr. 12, 2012, 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2012/04/12/federal-judge-prepares-sentence-sudbury- 
man-convicted-supporting-qaeda/F89T4ckwuVM7l14RFilF5O/story.html; Boeri, supra note 
1; Rowland, supra note 1. 
6 See infra notes 162–281 and accompanying text. 
7 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (HLP), 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2725 (2010). The Court 
noted that even peaceful contributions to a designated terror organization could assist the 
organization by lending it legitimacy and allowing the organization to use freed up re-
sources for violence. Id. 
8 See Brown, supra note 2, at 20. 
9 HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2727 (“Our precedents, old and new, make clear that concerns of 
national security and foreign relations do not warrant abdication of the judicial role. We 
do not defer to the Government’s reading of the First Amendment, even when such inter-
ests are at stake.”). But see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219–20 (1943) (defer-
ring to the government’s internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II). 
10 Jonathan Hafetz, Stretching Precedent Beyond Recognition: The Misplaced Reliance on 
World War II Cases in the “War on Terror,” 28 Rev. Litig. 365, 374 (2008). The Obama ad-
ministration believes that the War on Terror will last at least another decade. Greg Miller, 
Plan for Hunting Terrorists Signals U.S. Intends to Keep Adding Names to Kill Lists, Wash. Post, 
Oct. 23, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/plan-for-hunting-
terrorists-signals-us-intends-to-keep-adding-names-to-kill-lists/2012/10/23/4789b2ae-18b3-
11e2-a55c-39408fbe6a4b_story.html. 
11 See Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 291, 300 (1961) (upholding civil liberties in 
wartime); Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219–20 (deferring to the government’s restriction of civil 
liberties in wartime). 
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 This Note analyzes the implications of Mehanna’s conviction for 
free speech rights and the government’s approach to fighting terror, 
arguing that the government’s claim that Mehanna’s translations 
should be punished as conduct rather than speech run contrary to First 
Amendment law.12 The Note also argues that courts must define terms 
such as “independent advocacy” and “coordination” in order to evalu-
ate whether speech can be prosecuted under the Material Support 
Statute.13 Finally, this Note argues that the standard for incitement 
speech set out by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1969 in Brandenburg v. 
Ohio is not adequate for cases involving modern terrorism, and pro-
poses a new standard for incitement cases arising under the Material 
Support Statute.14 By properly defining terms for the Material Support 
Statute and developing a new incitement standard, courts can assert 
their role in protecting free speech rights rather than deferring to the 
government’s wishes in fighting terror.15 
 Part I of this Note discusses the history of the First Amendment 
during wartime and First Amendment doctrines relevant to Mehanna’s 
case.16 Part II provides an introduction to the government’s approach 
to fighting terror, the Material Support Statute, and the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision in 2010 in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (HLP).17 
Part III analyzes Menhanna’s case and its implications for free speech 
in the War on Terror.18 Finally, Part III concludes by suggesting that the 
Supreme Court establish more definite standards for material support 
cases, and proposes a new First Amendment incitement standard for 
these cases.19 
I. Protection of Speech During Wartime 
 The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects a wide va-
riety of speech, including speech that expresses unpopular and contro-
versial views.20 Although the First Amendment prevents the abridge-
                                                                                                                      
 
12 See infra notes 255–272 and accompanying text. 
13 See Providing Material Support to Terrorists, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006); Providing 
Material Support or Resources to Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339B; infra notes 212–250 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 251–323 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 212–323 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 20–82 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 83–161 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 162–323 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 212–323 and accompanying text. 
20 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (picketing the funerals of 
soldiers is protected speech); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414, 420 (1989) (burning the 
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ment of protected forms of speech, certain other forms of speech do 
not fall within its protection.21 Section A of this Part examines the his-
torical effect of war on the right to free speech.22 Section B considers 
content-based restrictions on speech and the levels of scrutiny courts 
use to evaluate laws restricting speech.23 Section C examines restric-
tions on speech that are likely to incite others to imminent violence or 
lawbreaking.24 Finally, Section D surveys First Amendment protection 
for recordings, such as movies, written words, and audio recordings.25 
                                                                                                                     
 This background informs First Amendment analysis of speech 
made in support of terrorists and the conviction of Tarek Mehanna.26 
Mehanna’s conviction occurred against the backdrop of the War on 
Terror and raises questions as to how the government will treat speech 
made in favor of its modern wartime opponents.27 The case also raises 
questions as to the level of scrutiny courts should apply to review gov-
ernment restriction of recorded materials made in favor of terrorist 
organizations.28 Finally, the case raises issues about whether the incite-
ment standard should be used in evaluating speech in support of ter-
ror.29 
 
American flag is protected speech). The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution pro-
vides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const. 
amend I. 
21 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (denying protection for speech cat-
egorized as incitement speech); Victor Brudney, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 
53 B.C. L. Rev. 1153, 1166 (2012) (discussing how false or misleading commercial speech 
is not protected by the First Amendment). 
22 See infra notes 30–47 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 48–63 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 64–73 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 74–82 and accompanying text. 
26 See Government’s Opp’n to Def.’s Motion to Dismiss Portions of Counts One 
Through Three of the Second Superseding Indictment at 19-–20, Mehanna, No. 09-CR-
10017-GAO (D. Mass. 2011) (arguing that the defendant’s translations should be treated 
as speech rather than conduct, meaning that strict scrutiny should not apply); Def.’s Mo-
tion for Preliminary Instruction to the Jury at 3, Mehanna, No. 09-CR-10017-GAO (D. Mass. 
2011) (disagreeing with the government and arguing instead that the incitement standard 
should apply in the Mehanna case); Brown, supra note 2, at 20 (discussing how Mehanna 
raises questions as to how the government will use speech in terrorism cases for potential 
preventive prosecutions). 
27 See infra notes 166–211 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 255–272 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 251–323 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Effect of War on the Right to Free Speech 
 The Supreme Court has a long history of deferring to the gov-
ernment’s restriction of speech during wartime when the restricted 
speech criticizes governmental policy or advocates support for oppo-
nents of the government’s war effort.30 During World War I and the 
Cold War, the Supreme Court held that no right to absolute free 
speech existed when the speech damaged U.S. war efforts or endan-
gered the nation’s security.31 In HLP, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
right to free speech did not protect individuals wishing to assist terrorist 
organizations.32 
 During World War I, the Espionage Act allowed the government to 
prosecute individuals for causing or attempting to cause insubordina-
tion in the armed forces and for obstructing military recruitment and 
enlistment.33 In several cases, the Supreme Court upheld convictions of 
individuals under the Espionage Act for criticism of the draft and U.S. 
involvement in World War I.34 
 The Court established that speech criticizing conscription during 
World War I constituted a danger to the nation which the government 
had the right to punish.35 In 1919 in Schenck v. United States, the U.S. Su-
preme Court ruled that the conviction of a man under the Espionage 
Act did not violate the First Amendment because the defendants’ words 
hindered the nation’s war effort and created a “clear and present dan-
ger” to the nation that Congress had the right to punish and prevent.36 
The defendants printed and mailed leaflets to draftees criticizing World 
War I and conscription, and the Court ruled that the First Amendment 
                                                                                                                      
30 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516–17 (1951); Schenck v. United States, 249 
U.S. 47, 52–53 (1919); The Supreme Court, 1998 Term—Leading Cases, 124 Harv. L. Rev. 259, 
259 (2010). 
31 Dennis, 341 U.S. at 516–17; Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52–53. 
32 130 S. Ct. at 2730 (“We simply hold that, in prohibiting the particular forms of sup-
port that plaintiffs seek to provide to foreign terrorist groups, § 2339B does not violate the 
freedom of speech.”). 
33 Espionage Act of 1917, 18 U.S.C. §§ 792–799 (2006); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 
211, 212 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 205 (1919); Schenck, 249 U.S. at 
48–49. 
34 Debs, 249 U.S at 216–17; Frohwerk, 249 U.S at 210; Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52–53. 
35 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52–53. 
36 249 U.S. at 52–53 (“We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defen-
dants in saying all that was said in the circular would have been within their constitutional 
rights. But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done. 
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting 
fire in a theatre and causing a panic.” (citation omitted)). 
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did not protect the right to attempt to cause military insubordination 
and obstruction of military recruitment and enlistment.37 
 The Court established that praising anti-war activists and the war 
effort of the United States’s opponent constitutes dangers to the nation 
that could be punished.38 In 1919 in Debs v. United States, the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that the conviction of a man under the Espionage 
Act for criticizing government wartime policy did not violate the First 
Amendment.39 The Court noted that the defendant had praised jailed 
anti-World War I activists during a public speech, claimed that the lis-
teners should not worry about treason charges and told the crowd that 
“you need to know that you are fit for something better than slavery 
and cannon fodder.”40 In 1919 in Frohwerk v. United States, the U.S. Su-
preme Court again reaffirmed the principle that the First Amendment 
did not necessarily protect the right to speak critically of governmental 
wartime policy.41 The Court upheld the conviction of an individual un-
der the Espionage Act for publishing newspaper articles praising the 
United States’s wartime opponent and criticizing the draft and the 
American war effort.42 
 During the Cold War, the Court held that speech advocating the 
overthrow of the U.S. government by communist revolution could be 
punished without violating the First Amendment.43 In 1951 in Dennis v. 
United States, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the conviction of mem-
bers of the Communist Party under the Smith Act for advocating the 
overthrow of the U.S. government through violent revolution.44 The 
                                                                                                                      
 
37 Id. at 50–51. 
38 Debs, 249 U.S at 213–14, 216–17; Frohwerk, 249 U.S at 207, 210. 
39 249 U.S. at 215–17. The defendant was found guilty of causing and attempting to 
cause military insubordination and obstructing and attempting to obstruct military enlist-
ment. Id. at 212. The defendant was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment for each count. Id. 
40 Id. at 213–14. 
41 249 U.S. at 206. 
42 Id. at 207, 210. 
43 Dennis, 341 U.S. at 497, 516. 
44 341 U.S. at 497, 517. The Smith Act provides, in pertinent part: 
 Whoever knowingly or willfully advocates, abets, advises, or teaches the du-
ty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the gov-
ernment of the United States . . . by force or violence . . . ; or 
. . . . 
. . . organizes or helps or attempts to organize any society, group, or assembly 
of persons who teach, advocate, or encourage the overthrow or destruction of 
any such government by force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or 
affiliates with, any such society, group, or assembly of persons, knowing the 
purposes thereof— 
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Court found that the convictions did not violate the defendants’ First 
Amendment rights, and that advocating the overthrow of the govern-
ment when the opportunity presented itself allowed the government to 
act.45 Nevertheless, ten years later in Noto v. United States, the U.S. Su-
preme Court overturned the conviction of defendants under the Smith 
Act on similar facts.46 The court found that the government could not 
lawfully convict defendants for teaching an abstract doctrine of future 
violent revolution, and that the government could only punish advo-
cacy of present or future violence substantially likely to occur.47 
B. Content-Based Restrictions on Speech and Tiers of Scrutiny 
  Although the Court has at times approved curtailment of speech 
made in favor of the government’s wartime opponent, the First 
Amendment generally precludes the government from banning speech 
based on objection to the speaker’s ideas.48 Content-based restrictions— 
where the speech ban is based on an objection to the speaker’s ideas— 
presumptively violate the First Amendment.49 A content-based law is 
subject to strict scrutiny, requiring the government to show that the law 
is (1) narrowly drawn and (2) advances a compelling governmental in-
terest.50 The Court requires a content-based speech restriction to satisfy 
strict scrutiny to prevent the government from banning certain ideas 
from public discourse.51 The government usually loses when content-
based laws are subject to strict scrutiny review.52 
                                                                                                                      
 Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, 
or both . . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 2385 (2006). 
45 Dennis, 341 U.S. at 503, 509. 
46 367 U.S. at 291, 300. 
47 Id. at 298–99. 
48 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). 
49 See id.; Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 
U.S. 105, 115 (1991). 
50 See Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 118; Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 
221, 231 (1987); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 
575, 591–92 (1983). 
51 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 387; Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 116. 
52 Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First Amend-
ment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 783, 784. Although strict scrutiny is difficult for the 
government to overcome, its use should not be regarded as outcome determinative. Mat-
thew D. Bunker et al., Strict in Theory, but Feeble in Fact? First Amendment Strict Scrutiny and the 
Protection of Speech, 16 Comm. L. & Pol’y 349, 351 (2011). The government won twenty-two 
percent of the cases in which a court employed strict scrutiny to evaluate First Amendment 
free speech claims in the period between 1990 and 2003. Id. 
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 In addition to strict scrutiny, courts may also use less rigorous 
standards, such as the intermediate scrutiny and rational basis tests, to 
evaluate whether the government may constitutionally restrict speech 
when the restriction is not based on an objection to the speaker’s ide-
as.53 The government will often argue for courts to use these standards 
to evaluate speech restrictions to avoid the more rigorous strict scrutiny 
standard.54 Courts may evaluate speech under the less rigorous inter-
mediate scrutiny standard when a law aimed at regulating conduct only 
incidentally burdens the right to free speech.55 Courts may also employ 
the rarely invoked rational basis test, which is highly deferential to the 
government.56 Finally, the government may attempt to avoid strict scru-
tiny review by claiming that the speech at issue is not protected by the 
First Amendment or that the speech constitutes criminal conduct that 
only incidentally involves speech.57 
 In 1991, in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State 
Crime Victims Board, the U.S. Supreme Court provided an example of 
when it would utilize the more demanding strict scrutiny test; the Court 
ruled that a law singling out works that described criminal activities did 
not pass strict scrutiny review and accordingly violated the First 
Amendment.58 In that case, the law required an accused or convicted 
criminal to deposit money made from works that depicted the crimi-
nal’s crimes into an account made available to the criminal’s victims 
                                                                                                                      
53 See Bhagwat, supra note 52, at 784 (explaining how the intermediate scrutiny stan-
dard was developed by the Court as a unitary standard of review to encompass free speech 
tests that did not fit into either the strict scrutiny or rational basis standard); Bunker et al., 
supra note 52, at 357 (noting that courts can avoid applying strict scrutiny by finding that a 
law is content-neutral rather than content-based, by treating the law as one of general ap-
plicability where speech restrictions are incidental, or by holding that the speech is not 
protected by the First Amendment); Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable 
Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 
Cornell L. Rev. 1277, 1281 (2005) (evaluating examples where certain speech should be 
treated as conduct rather than speech). 
54 See Bhagwat, supra note 52, at 784; Bunker et al., supra note 52, at 357; Volokh, supra 
note 53, at 1281. 
55 See HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2724; Bhagwat, supra note 52, at 824–25. The intermediate 
scrutiny standard includes a variety of tests combined into a single standard of review. 
Bhagwat, supra note 52, at 784. These tests include time, place, and manner restrictions, 
regulations of symbolic conduct and regulations of commercial speech. Id. at 788–95. Laws 
subject to intermediate scrutiny review will be valid if they (1) serve a substantial govern-
ment interest, and (2) are reasonably tailored in furtherance of this purpose. Id. at 801. 
56 Bhagwat, supra note 52, at 784. Laws subject to rational basis review are upheld if 
they are rationally related to a valid governmental interest. Id. at 786. 
57 Bunker et al., supra note 52, at 357; Volokh, supra note 53, at 1281. 
58 502 U.S. at 108, 115. 
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and creditors.59 The Court ruled that the law operated as a content-
based restriction because it singled out certain works solely on the basis 
of their content—describing crimes.60 The Court found that the statute 
advanced compelling governmental interests by preventing criminals 
from profiting from crimes and by compensating victims.61 Neverthe-
less, the Court found that the statute would produce absurd results by 
blocking a wide array of authors from profiting from books describing 
crimes.62 As a result, the Court ruled that the statute was not suffi-
ciently narrowly tailored as required by strict scrutiny and thus violated 
the First Amendment.63 
                                                                                                                     
C. Incitement and the First Amendment 
 In addition to strict scrutiny’s protection of speech, the incitement 
standard protects advocacy of violence and unlawfulness under the First 
Amendment so long as the advocacy does not rise to the level of in-
citement.64 The Supreme Court ruled in Brandenburg that the advocacy 
of violence or lawbreaking is constitutionally protected, unless (1) the 
advocacy is made to incite imminent unlawful activity, and (2) the 
speech is likely to incite unlawful activity.65 In Brandenburg the Court 
held that an Ohio statute criminalizing the advocacy of violence and 
terrorism to cause political reform violated the First Amendment right 
to free speech.66 The government prosecuted the defendant under the 
statute for making a speech at a Ku Klux Klan gathering advocating 
possible vengeance against the government.67 
 In 1982 in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., the U.S. Supreme 
Court reaffirmed that speech advocating violence or unlawful activity is 
protected by the First Amendment so long as the speech is not likely to 
 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 116. 
61 Id. at 119. 
62 Id. at 121–22. The Court observed that the statute would be applicable to works by 
authors such as Malcolm X, Saint Augustine, Martin Luther King, Jr., Sir Walter Raleigh, 
and Jesse Jackson. Id. 
63 Id. at 123. 
64 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
65 Id.; see NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928–29 (1982); Hess v. In-
diana, 414 U.S. 105, 108–09 (1973). 
66 395 U.S. at 449. The statute also criminalized “voluntarily assembl[ing] with any so-
ciety, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of crimi-
nal syndicalism.” Id. at 445. 
67 Id. at 446. The defendant said, “We’re not a revengent [sic] organization, but if our 
President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the white, Caucasian 
race, it’s possible that there might have to be some revengeance [sic] taken.” Id. 
720 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:711 
produce imminent violence or lawbreaking.68 In Claiborne, the Court 
also stated that proof of actual violence resulting from speech can show 
that the speech constituted incitement.69 Here, the speech occurred 
against the backdrop of a boycott of white merchants in civil rights-era 
Mississippi.70 The case involved a speaker telling a crowd at a speech 
that “if we catch any of you going in any of them racist stores, we’re 
gonna break your damn neck.”71 Although the Court held that the First 
Amendment protected the speaker’s speech, it noted that it might have 
qualified as unprotected incitement had the speech resulted in acts of 
violence.72 The Court also noted that the imminence requirement 
could not be satisfied when violence occurs weeks or months after the 
speech in question.73 
D. First Amendment Protection of the Presentation of Recorded Materials:  
The Right to Send and Receive Ideas 
 In addition to speech advocating violence that does not rise to the 
level of incitement, the First Amendment also protects recorded mate-
rials including film, audio tapes, and the written word.74 An actor pre-
senting words or images previously written, spoken or produced by 
others thus engages in speech for First Amendment purposes.75 An ac-
tor has a First Amendment right to present such materials even when 
such materials contain ideas that are offensive to others.76 
 The First Amendment also protects the right to disseminate words 
spoken by others.77 In 2001 in Bartnicki v. Vopper, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that the First Amendment protected intentional disclosures 
of an illegally obtained cell phone conversation disseminated via news-
paper and radio.78 In 1982 in Board of Education v. Pico, the U.S. Su-
                                                                                                                      
 
68 See 458 U.S. at 928. 
69 Id. at 928–29. 
70 Id. at 888, 902. 
71 Id. at 902, 928–29. 
72 Id. at 928. 
73 Id. 
74 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 
867 (1982); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208 (1975). 
75 See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 535; Pico, 457 U.S. at 867; Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 208. 
76 See Pico, 457 U.S. at 861–62, 867; Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 208 (observing that “when 
the government, acting as censor, undertakes selectively to shield the public from some 
kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others, the First Amend-
ment strictly limits its power”). 
77 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 517–19; Pico, 457 U.S. at 866–67. 
78 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 517–19. The defendant in Bartnicki legally obtained an illegally 
recorded cell phone conversation and disseminated the contents of the conversation 
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preme Court ruled that the First Amendment prevented school boards 
from removing books from school libraries because of disagreement 
with ideas contained within the books.79 The First Amendment also 
protects the right to disseminate films made by others.80 
 The aforementioned cases make clear that the First Amendment 
protects recorded materials even when the recorded materials were ob-
tained by illegal means or expressed “vulgar” or offensive views.81 The 
cases also stand for the principle that an actor presenting offensive or 
controversial materials produced by another enjoys constitutional pro-
tection so long as the materials do not transgress the limits of the First 
Amendment.82 
II. Criminalizing Material Support for Terrorism: Implications 
for Free Speech 
 The government’s preemptive approach to fighting terror raises a 
number of implications for free speech rights.83 Specifically, the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project 
(HLP) leaves unresolved key issues regarding criminalization of speech 
                                                                                                                      
through radio and newspaper. Id. at 519. The Court ruled that the application of a statute 
punishing willful disclosure of an intercepted conversation violated the First Amendment. 
Id. at 524–25, 535. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the privacy concerns in the case 
were outweighed by the importance of disseminating speech addressing matters of public 
concern. Id. at 534–35. The disclosure of the illegally recorded cell phone conversation 
occurred against the backdrop of contentious negotiations between a teacher’s union and 
a school board in Pennsylvania. Id. at 518. 
79 Pico, 457 U.S. at 867, 872 (holding that the removal of books from school libraries un-
constitutionally violated the right to send and receive the ideas contained within the books). 
80 Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 208. In Erznoznik, the Court ruled that a statute banning drive-
in movie theaters from showing films depicting nudity violated the First Amendment. Id. at 
206, 217. The Court held that the First Amendment prevented the government from sin-
gling out films containing nudity as being more offensive to passersby than any other type 
of movie. Id. at 208–09. 
81 See Pico, 457 U.S. at 861–62, 867; Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 208. 
82 See Pico, 457 U.S. at 861–62, 867; Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 208. 
83 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 Yale L.J. 1029, 1043 (2004) 
(noting that Korematsu has never been overruled, and arguing that the uncertain duration 
and evolving goals of the War on Terror could result in the normalization of measures that 
impede civil liberties); Brown, supra note 2, at 2–3; Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, 
What Is War?: Reflections on Free Speech in “Wartime,” 36 Rutgers L.J. 833, 851 (2005) (noting 
that Schenck and Dennis have never been explicitly overruled, and raising the possibility 
that the Court could retreat to some variation of the deferential “clear and present dan-
ger” test); Erwin Chemerinsky, Free Speech and the “War on Terror,” Trial, Jan. 2011, at 54, 56 
(expressing concern that the Court’s decision in HLP punished speech without a showing 
that the speech would be likely to cause harm). 
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made in support of terror organizations.84 Section A of this Part exam-
ines the unique challenges faced by the government in the War on Ter-
ror and the preemptive methods used to combat terrorists.85 Section B 
considers the Material Support Statute’s criminalization of the provi-
sion of material support to terrorists and terrorist organizations.86 Fi-
nally, Section C discusses the Supreme Court’s consideration of the Ma-
terial Support Statute’s criminalization of support for terrorism and its 
effect on the right to free speech.87 
A. Challenges in Fighting Terror: The Ineffectiveness of the Traditional 
Criminal Process, the Internet, and Homegrown Terrorists 
 In the aftermath of 9/11, the U.S. government has utilized uncon-
ventional preemptive methods to combat terrorism.88 The government 
attempts to prevent attacks before they occur, rather than punishing 
culprits after attacks, due to concerns that modern terrorists will not be 
deterred by the apprehension and punishment of other terrorists pur-
suant to the traditional criminal process.89 Additionally, the threat 
posed by Internet use by terror groups like al Qaeda has led the gov-
ernment to reference online activity in an increasing number of crimi-
nal complaints involving terrorist activities.90 The U.S. government also 
seeks to find potential homegrown terrorists in the United States be-
fore they engage in attacks.91 These factors informed United States v. 
Mehanna, a 2011 U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
case, which involved the government’s preventive prosecution of an 
allegedly homegrown online supporter of al Qaeda.92 
                                                                                                                      
84 See infra notes 142–161 and accompanying text. 
85 See infra notes 88–126 and accompanying text. 
86 See infra notes 127–141 and accompanying text. 
87 See infra notes 142–161 and accompanying text. 
88 Jarret Brachman, Policing al Qaeda’s Army of Rhetorical Terrorists, 37 Wm. Mitchell L. 
Rev. 5225, 5228 (2011); Charles A. Shanor, Terrorism, Historical Analogies and Modern Choic-
es, 24 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 589, 592 (2010). 
89 Brown, supra note 3. 
90 See Brachman, supra note 88, at 5228. 
91 Robert S. Mueller, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Address at the City Club of Cleve-
land ( June 23, 2006), http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/the-threat-of-homegrown-terrorism 
(discussing the FBI’s desire to “find and stop homegrown terrorists before they strike”); Pro-
tecting America Through Investigation and Criminal Prosecution, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, http:// 
www.justice.gov/911/protect.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2013) (detailing instances where the 
Department of Justice has arrested potential homegrown terrorists before they commit at-
tacks). 
92 See Brown, supra note 2, at 20. 
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1. The Ineffectiveness of the Traditional Criminal Process in Fighting 
Terror 
 Both the Bush and Obama administrations have fought the War 
on Terror under the assumption that the government must actively 
prevent potential terrorists from committing attacks.93 This approach is 
rooted in the belief that the traditional criminal process of apprehend-
ing and punishing criminals after the commission of crimes will not 
succeed in fighting modern terrorists, some of whom are committed to 
martyrdom.94 Thus, rather than punishing terrorists after an attack, the 
U.S. government seeks to prevent acts of terror before they occur.95 
 One reason for this preventive stance is the belief that some poten-
tial terrorists will not be deterred by the apprehension and punishment 
of other terrorists, especially potential terrorists committed to martyr-
dom.96 If the fear of death does not dissuade a potential terrorist from 
committing attacks, then there is little chance that the fear of appre-
hension and conviction will dissuade them.97 This uncomfortable truth 
was recently illustrated by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian na-
tional who unsuccessfully attempted to kill himself and passengers on 
an airplane in Detroit by detonating explosives contained in his un-
derwear in December 2009.98 Abdulmutallab proceeded with his plan 
even though he would die if it was successful and he would likely re-
ceive a lengthy prison sentence if it was unsuccessful.99 
 The government’s preemptive approach means that it will often 
seek to punish potential terrorists before they are able to commit at-
tacks.100 This means that speech made in support of terror groups can 
be used as evidence that an individual is in the process of becoming a 
terrorist threat.101 The government’s need to provide security may thus 
                                                                                                                      
93 See id. at 2–3. 
94 See id.; Shanor, supra note 88, at 592. 
95 Brown, supra note 3. 
96 Shanor, supra note 88, at 592; Brown, supra note 3. 
97 See Shanor, supra note 88, at 592. 
98 See Ian Kennedy, Note, Military Commissions, Criminal Court, and the Christmas Day 
Bomber, 34 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 413, 413–14 (2011). 
99 Joshua Keating, Underwear Bomber Gets Life, Foreign Policy (Feb. 16, 2012), http:// 
passport.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/02/16/underwear_bomber_gets_life. Abdulmutal-
lab received life in prison for his attempted attack. Id. Abdulmutallab’s life sentence is identi-
cal to the sentence given to other unsuccessful terrorists, such as Zacarias Moussaoui and 
Richard Reid. Id. 
100 Brown, supra note 3. 
101 Brown, supra note 2, at 3–4. 
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come into conflict with the tradition of protecting the freedom of 
speech from governmental interference.102 
2. Terrorist Activities on the Internet 
 The Internet provides many advantages to modern terrorists not 
previously available to insurgents engaged in traditional warfare, making 
the Internet an important venue in the government’s antiterrorism ef-
forts.103 The prevalence and ease of Internet access allows terrorist or-
ganizations to cheaply and easily recruit others, disseminate propa-
ganda, obtain financing, and coordinate operational plans.104 Addition-
ally, in recent years al Qaeda has encouraged online support by 
equating support made over the Internet to support for al Qaeda on the 
battlefield.105 
 The Internet also provides al Qaeda with an audience of online 
supporters who may eventually be inspired by online al Qaeda advocacy 
to commit actual terror attacks against the United States.106 Al Qaeda’s 
encouragement of online support for terrorism may in some instances 
be constitutionally protected even though it potentially endangers U.S. 
national security.107 As long as advocacy of committing violence and 
lawbreaking does not rise to the level of incitement, proponents of vio-
lence within the United States may be protected by the First Amend-
ment.108 The government faces a challenge because all that it may take 
for a terrorist attack to succeed is for one individual from a potentially 
large al Qaeda audience to attack the United States.109 The govern-
ment has also shown its willingness to take action against online sup-
port for terror by successfully prosecuting Tarek Mehanna under the 
Material Support Statute for translating al Qaeda propaganda for 
                                                                                                                      
102 Id. 
103 See Shanor, supra note 88, at 612–13. 
104 Brachman, supra note 88, at 5229; Steven R. Morrison, Terrorism Online: Is Speech the 
Same as It Ever Was?, 44 Creighton L. Rev. 963, 984 (2011); Shanor, supra note 88, at 612–13. 
105 Brachman, supra note 88, at 5528; Jarret Brachman, Watching the Watchers, Foreign 
Policy (Nov. 10, 2010) http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/10/11/watching_the_ 
watchers (discussing how an online al Qaeda propaganda documentary titled The Power of 
Truth, narrated by al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, became an online sensation and 
raised al-Zawahiri’s profile in the al Qaeda movement). 
106 See Brachman, supra note 88, at 5528; Morrison, supra note 104, at 996. 
107 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
108 See id.; supra notes 64–73 and accompanying text. Advocacy of violence or lawbreak-
ing is constitutionally protected unless (1) the advocacy is made to incite immediate un-
lawful activity, and (2) the speech is likely to incite unlawful activity. Id. 
109 See Morrison, supra note 104, at 996. 
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Internet dissemination.110 Mehanna also represented another issue in 
the government’s fight against terror, as he was a U.S. citizen and re-
garded as a potential homegrown terrorist.111 
                                                                                                                     
3. Homegrown Terrorists 
 The government seeks to prevent terror attacks from being carried 
out by U.S. citizens and aliens who reside in the United States.112 Ter-
rorists residing in the United States have a number of tactical advan-
tages that make it nearly impossible for the government to eradicate 
the threat of terrorism.113 In serving non-state actors such as al Qaeda, 
terrorists often seek to attack civilians rather than engage in direct mili-
tary confrontation.114 This means that a terror attack can take place 
nearly anywhere, making it difficult for the government to predict 
where attacks might occur.115 Furthermore, terrorists are able to cam-
ouflage themselves as ordinary citizens, a problem exacerbated when 
the terrorists are U.S. citizens or reside in the United States.116 Thus, 
encouraging homegrown terror in the United States provides groups 
such as al Qaeda with a cheap and unpredictable means of waging war 
against the United States.117 
 Many recent attacks and attempted attacks have caused the gov-
ernment to vigilantly combat attacks by homegrown terrorists.118 For 
example, the 9/11 hijackers resided in the United States for long peri-
ods of time before the attacks, and accused 9/11 mastermind Khalid 
Sheikh Mohammed earned a degree in mechanical engineering from a 
U.S. university.119 More recently, naturalized U.S. citizen Faisal Shahzad 
 
110 See infra notes 166–175 and accompanying text. 
111 See Brown, supra note 2, at 2--3; Boeri, supra note 1. 
112 See Scott Shane, Radical U.S. Muslims Little Threat, Study Says, N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/08/us/radical-muslim-americans-pose-little-threat-study- 
says.html?_r=2&ref=world. 
113 See Brian Z. Tamanaha, Are We Safer from Terrorism? No, but We Can Be, 28 Yale L. & 
Pol’y Rev. 419, 429–30 (2010). 
114 See id. 
115 See id. at 430. 
116 See id. 
117 See Brachman, supra note 88, at 5228. 
118 Mueller, supra note 91; Protecting America Through Investigation and Criminal Prosecu-
tion, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 91. 
119 Tamanaha, supra note 113, at 433. Most of the 9/11 hijackers lived in the United 
States between approximately two years and four months prior to the attacks, and one of 
them, Hani Hanjour, had periodically resided in the United States as early as 1991. Nat’l 
Comm’n on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Re-
port 215, 225, 237 (2004). 
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unsuccessfully attempted to set off a car bomb in Times Square and U.S. 
citizen Major Nidal Malik Hasan killed thirteen people and wounded 
forty-three others in a shooting attack at Fort Hood.120 Furthermore, 
Hasan had been in direct email contact with now deceased American 
citizen and al Qaeda propagandist and operative Anwar al-Awlaki.121 
 The government has utilized a variety of means to detect potential 
homegrown terrorist activities.122 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 permitted the FBI to investigate people based on the 
content of their speech.123 In the aftermath of 9/11, the FBI was author-
ized to send undercover agents to public meetings at mosques to detect 
potential terrorist activity.124 Further, the Patriot Act permitted the FBI 
to obtain records from service providers, including phone and Internet 
records.125 Yet, perhaps the most important statute in the government's 
arsenal for detecting terrorist attacks before they occur is the Material 
Support Statute.126 
B. Criminalizing Material Support for Terrorism 
 The Material Support Statute serves as an important tool in the 
government's attempt to detect potential terrorists and to prevent terror 
attacks.127 Over the past several decades, the Material Support Statute 
has increased the severity of punishment for supporting terror.128 In the 
aftermath of the 1993 World Trade Center Bombings, Congress passed a 
statute codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2339A in an effort to prevent the provi-
                                                                                                                      
120 U.S. Dep’t of Def., Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood 1 (2010); 
Andrew Lebovich, The LWOT: Bombing Attempt in Times Square Fails; Lieberman Wants to Strip 
Citizenship of Suspected American Terrorists, Foreign Policy (May 6, 2010), http://www.foreign 
policy.com/articles/2010/05/06/the_lwot_bombing_attempt_in_times_square_fails_lieber 
man_wants_to_strip_citizens. 
121 Brachman, supra note 88, at 5230–31. 
122 Id. at 5232–33; Morrison, supra note 104, at 970. 
123 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 323, 
110 Stat. 1214, 1255 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006)) (amending 18 
U.S.C. § 2339A (1994), which had extended First Amendment protection to expressions of 
support for the nonviolent activities of terrorist organizations); Morrison, supra note 104, 
at 970. 
124 Morrison, supra note 104, at 970. 
125 Id. 
126 See Brown, supra note 3. 
127 See id. 
128 Katherine R. Zerwas, Note, No Strict Scrutiny—The Court’s Deferential Position on Mate-
rial Support to Terrorism in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 37 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 
5337, 5338–40 (2011). 
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sion of “material support” for terrorists.129 Among other things, the stat-
ute defined “material support” as providing financial services, training, 
personnel and expert advice or assistance to terrorists.130 Section 2339A 
criminalizes the provision of material support when the actor knows or 
intends that the material support will be used to prepare for or to carry 
out one of over forty crimes specified in the statute.131 Thus, § 2339A 
criminalizes the provision of material support when the support will be 
used to further specified crimes.132 
 Following the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombings, Congress amended 
§ 2339A to ease certain prosecutorial impediments present in the orig-
inal statute.133 The new legislation included a new material support sec-
tion codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2339B and a provision designating Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1189.134 Section 2339B’s 
                                                                                                                      
 
129 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 
Stat 1796 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006)); Zerwas, supra note 128, at 
5339. Section 2339A provides, in pertinent part: 
(a) Offense.—Whoever provides material support or resources . . . or at-
tempts or conspires to do such an act, shall be fined under this title, impris-
oned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the death of any person results, 
shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. . . . 
(b) Definitions. . . . 
 (1) the term “material support or resources” means any property, tangible 
or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or fi-
nancial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assis-
tance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications 
equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or 
more individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except 
medicine or religious materials; 
 (2) the term “training” means instruction or teaching designed to impart 
a specific skill, as opposed to general knowledge; and 
 (3) the term “expert advice or assistance” means advice or assistance de-
rived from scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge. 
18 U.S.C. § 2339A. 
130 18 U.S.C. § 2339A; see Zerwas, supra note 128, at 5339. 
131 18 U.S.C. § 2339A; Brown, supra note 2, at 10, 29. 
132 See Brown, supra note 2, at 10–11. 
133 Zerwas, supra note 128, at 5339; see supra note 123 and accompanying text (outlin-
ing how the AEDPA amended § 2339A to give the FBI power to investigate based on the 
content of speech). 
134 Zerwas, supra note 128, at 5339; Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 8 
U.S.C. § 1189 (2006); Providing Material Support or Resources to Designated Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. Section 2339B provides, in pertinent part: 
(a) Prohibited Activities. . . . 
 (1) Unlawful conduct.—Whoever knowingly provides material support or 
resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do 
so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or 
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definition of “material support” is the same definition provided in 
§ 2339A.135 Rather than criminalizing material support given for speci-
fied crimes, § 2339B instead criminalizes material support to an organi-
zation designated as a foreign terrorist organization by § 1189.136 The 
U.S. Secretary of State holds the authority to designate a group as a 
Foreign Terrorist Organization pursuant to § 1189.137 Section 2339B 
thus criminalizes the provision of material support when the support 
will be used to further specified organizations.138 
 After the 9/11 attacks, Congress again amended § 2339A and 
§ 2339B, raising the maximum prison sentence to fifteen years or life in 
prison if death results from providing material support to terrorists.139 
Congress also amended the Material Support Statute by specifically de-
fining terms, such as “training” and “expert advice or assistance.”140 
Sections 2339A and 2339B are crucial to the analysis of the Mehanna 
case because the defendant was charged with violating both sections.141 
C. The Supreme Court’s Consideration of the Material Support Statute in 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project 
 In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Holder v. Humanitarian 
Law Project (HLP) that § 2339B of the Material Support Statute did not 
violate the plaintiff’s right to free speech as guaranteed by the First 
Amendment.142 The plaintiff in the case sought to provide political and 
humanitarian support to organizations designated as foreign terrorist 
organizations but refrained from doing so for fear of being prosecuted 
under § 2339B for providing material support to a terrorist organiza-
tion.143 The Court held that the government’s finding that a ban on 
                                                                                                                      
both, and, if the death of any person results, shall be imprisoned for any term 
of years or for life . . . 
(g) Definitions. . . . 
 (6) the term “terrorist organization” means an organization designated as 
a terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act. 
18 U.S.C. § 2339B. 
135 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B. 
136 8 U.S.C. § 1189; 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. 
137 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1). 
138 Brown, supra note 2, at 11. 
139 Zerwas, supra note 128, at 5340. 
140 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (HLP), 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2720 (2010). 
141 See infra notes 168–171 and accompanying text. 
142 HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2730. 
143 Id. at 2714. 
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material support would hinder the activities of terrorist organizations 
should be accorded deference.144 The Court also endorsed the validity 
of the statute as a preventative measure to halt terrorist attacks, rather 
than a statute punishing terrorist attacks after the fact.145 
 In evaluating § 2339B’s restriction on the HLP’s right to speak, the 
Court found that the statute survived strict scrutiny review.146 The 
Court began its analysis by noting that § 2339B operated as a content-
based restriction on speech because it prohibited speaking to organiza-
tions when the content of the speech would constitute material sup-
port.147 For example, speaking to the organizations about political ad-
vocacy could constitute “training” or “specialized knowledge,” which 
are banned forms of material support.148 The Court then found that 
§ 2339B’s ban on speech passed strict scrutiny because (1) the law was 
narrowly drawn to ban only speech under the direction of or in coor-
dination with foreign terror groups and (2) the law advanced the gov-
ernment’s compelling interest in fighting terror.149 
 The Court’s ruling in HLP involved a significant amount of defer-
ence to the political branches.150 The Court noted that the political 
branches were more suited to “collecting evidence and drawing factual 
inferences in this area,” and deferred to Congress’s finding that any 
provision of support, including speech, could further terrorist organi-
zations’ violent ends.151 The Court held § 2339B’s ban on plaintiffs’ 
desired speech to be valid for two reasons.152 First, the court found that 
HLP’s legal training of banned terror organizations and political advo-
cacy on behalf of the two organizations would free up resources that 
the organizations could use for violent purposes.153 Second, the Court 
held that HLP’s actions would lend legitimacy to the organizations, 
thus enhancing the terrorist organizations’ ability to raise money and 
recruit members for terror attacks.154 
                                                                                                                      
144 Id. at 2728. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 2723–24; Brown, supra note 2, at 28–29. 
147 HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2723–24. 
148 Id. at 2724. 
149 Id. at 2724–25. Recall that content-based restrictions on speech demand strict scru-
tiny review. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
150 HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2727. 
151 Id. at 2724, 2727. 
152 Id. at 2725. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
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 The Court’s ruling that § 2339B only reaches speech under the di-
rection of or in coordination with a terrorist organization is one of the 
most crucial parts of the opinion, especially because the Court did not 
explicitly define what coordination entails.155 The Court stated that in-
dependent advocacy for terror organizations is protected from prosecu-
tion under § 2339B by the First Amendment, but did not explain how 
“independent advocacy” differs from “coordination” or “direction.”156 
Although the Court drew language about direction from § 2339B’s def-
inition of “personnel,” language about coordination with a terrorist or-
ganization does not appear in either § 2339A or § 2339B.157 The Court’s 
test of coordination seems to be a more relaxed standard than direction, 
meaning that it may now be easier to prove connection with a terrorist 
organization under the Material Support Statute.158 It is important to 
realize that the Court does not explicitly define the difference between 
speech coordinated with or directed by a terrorist organization and 
speech made independently of a terrorist organization.159 The distinc-
tion is important, as speech constituting independent advocacy is pro-
tected under the First Amendment whereas speech constituting coordi-
nation with a terrorist organization is not.160 As a result, there is consid-
erable uncertainty as to what sort of relationship an individual must 
have with an organization to be convicted under § 2339B.161 
III. United States v. Mehanna and Its Implications for Free 
Speech in the War on Terror 
 Tarek Mehanna’s case has a number of implications for the future 
of the First Amendment in material support cases.162 Section A of this 
Part examines the background and facts involved in Mehanna’s convic-
tion under the Material Support Statute.163 Section B considers the 
meaning of “independent advocacy” and “coordination” under the Ma-
                                                                                                                      
155 See id. at 2722; Brown, supra note 2, at 21–22. 
156 HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2722. 
157 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B (2006); HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2722. 
158 See Brown, supra note 2, at 21–22, 24. 
159 See HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2722. 
160 See infra notes 218–229 and accompanying text. 
161 See Brown, supra note 2, at 24. 
162 See Government’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Portions of Counts One Through 
Three of the Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 26, at 21–23; Def.’s Mem. of Law 
in Supp. of His Mot. to Dismiss Portions of Counts One Through Three of the Second 
Superseding Indictment at 11–12, United States v. Mehanna, No. 09-CR-10017-GAO (D. 
Mass. 2011). 
163 See infra notes 166–211 and accompanying text. 
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terial Support Statute and argues that courts must develop clear defini-
tions to safeguard free speech rights in material support cases.164 Finally, 
Section C examines the incitement standard and argues that a new 
standard should be developed for speech in material support cases.165 
A. United States v. Mehanna: Material Support for Translation of 
Propaganda 
 In 2011 in United States v. Mehanna, the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts found U.S. citizen Tarek Mehanna guilty of 
conspiracy to provide material support or resources to a designated 
foreign terrorist organization and attempting to provide and providing 
material support to terrorists.166 Among other things, the government 
charged that Mehanna provided material support and attempted to 
provide material support by translating al Qaeda propaganda into Eng-
lish and disseminating it over the Internet.167 
 The government’s case against Mehanna involved charges of ma-
terial support for terror against an individual on the basis of his speech, 
rather than for his commission of violent acts.168 The government al-
leged that Mehanna flew to Yemen in 2004 in an attempt to undergo 
military training at a terrorist training camp but was unsuccessful in the 
endeavor.169 Following this experience, the government claimed that 
Mehanna began providing material support to al Qaeda by translating 
al Qaeda propaganda into English and distributing the material on the 
Internet.170 The government alleged that Mehanna violated § 2339A 
and § 2339B by distributing videos supporting al Qaeda.171 
                                                                                                                      
164 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (HLP), 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2721, 2723, 2726 
(2010); infra notes 212–250 and accompanying text. 
165 See infra notes 251–323 and accompanying text. 
166 Rowland, supra note 1. Mehanna was convicted on four terrorism-related charges. Id. 
Mehanna has appealed the verdict. Brief of Defendant-Appellant Tarek Mehanna at 1, Me-
hanna v. United States, No. 12-1461 (1st Cir. Dec. 17, 2012). The government convicted Me-
hanna of providing material support to terrorists under § 2339A and conspiracy to provide 
material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization under § 2339B. Jury Verdict 
Form, Mehanna, No. 09-CR-10017-GAO (D. Mass. 2011); Rowland, supra note 1. 
167 Government’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Portions of Counts One Through 
Three of the Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 26, at 5–6. 
168 Boeri, supra note 4. 
169 Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 3, at 5. Mehanna claims to have travelled 
to Yemen for educational purposes. Milton J. Valencia, Mehanna Lawyer Lashes Out at Prosecu-
tors, Bos. Globe, Nov. 9, 2011, http://bostonglobe.com/metro/2011/11/09/mehanna-lawyer- 
lashes-out-prosecutors/FEuRq4U8FarHClcbGwdVqO/story.html. 
170 Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 3, at 8, 15. 
171 Id. at 6–7, 15. 
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 A centerpiece of the government’s case against Mehanna was his 
translation and distribution of a pro-jihadi propaganda text called 39 
Ways to Serve and Participate in Jihad (“39 Ways”).172 Among other things, 
39 Ways calls on Muslims to support jihad and incite other Muslims to 
engage in it.173 Upon finishing the translation, Mehanna is alleged to 
have provided the translation to a jihadi website called Tibyan Publica-
tions that published and distributed it.174 In making its case that Me-
hanna provided material support to al Qaeda, the government pointed 
to online discussions Mehanna had with a collaborator in which they 
boasted about being al Qaeda’s “English Wing.”175 
 The government in Mehanna had an abundance of evidence that 
Mehanna supported the aims of the terror organization to whom he 
allegedly provided material support.176 The evidence included Me-
hanna’s expressions of sympathy for Osama bin Laden and the 9/11 
hijackers and his distribution of videos to friends that depicted insur-
gents abusing the remains of U.S. soldiers in Iraq.177 The government 
argued that even if Mehanna did not coordinate with al Qaeda or was 
directly controlled by the group, he should be found guilty if he pro-
duced translations he believed al Qaeda could use or that would ad-
vance the group’s cause.178 
 Mehanna’s conviction for conspiracy to provide material support 
to a designated foreign terrorist organization and provision of support 
to terrorists followed a trial in which the government and Mehanna 
differed substantially on whether terms such as independent advocacy 
and coordination should be applied to Mehanna.179 The government 
in Mehanna sought to establish that proving coordination is necessary 
in only a limited number of material support cases, and that the term 
                                                                                                                      
172 Id. at 8. 
173 Government’s Proffer and Mem. in Supp. of Detention at 64–66, Mehanna, No. 09-
CR-00017-GAO (2011). 
174 Id. at 10. 
175 Id. at 11. The government also points to Mehanna’s comment that he hoped that 
his translation of 39 Ways “makes an impact.” Id. at 14. 
176 Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 3, at 8–9. 
177 Id., at 8–9; Government’s Proffer and Mem. in Supp. of Detention, supra note 173, 
at 32. 
178 Def.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of His Mot. to Dismiss Portions of Counts One 
Through Three of the Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 162, at 12. 
179 See Government’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Portions of Counts One Through 
Three of the Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 26, at 20–23; Def.’s Mem. of Law 
in Supp. of His Mot. to Dismiss Portions of Counts One Through Three of the Second 
Superseding Indictment, supra note 162, at 11–12. 
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coordination should be construed broadly.180 In contrast, Mehanna 
sought to establish that coordination is a necessary element in all cases 
involving the Material Support Statute, and that an individual only acts 
in coordination when he is controlled by a terrorist organization.181 
 The Court in Mehanna did not provide specific definitions for 
terms such as independent advocacy and coordination.182 In instruct-
ing the jurors on the terms, the Court simply said that a defendant 
must be working in coordination with or at the direction of a foreign 
terror organization to be convicted under § 2339B.183 The Court fur-
ther stated that a defendant who acts independently of a terror organi-
zation cannot be convicted under § 2339B.184 The closest the Court 
came to providing a definition for the terms occurred when the judge 
stated at a charging conference that he planned on giving the jury a 
“plain-and-ordinary-meaning” instruction.185 In any case, the Court did 
not seem to clear up the confusion as to how independent advocacy 
and coordination should be defined.186 
 The government in Mehanna sought to establish that issues of co-
ordination and independent advocacy apply in only a limited number 
of material support cases.187 The government claimed that it only 
needs to prove that an individual’s speech exceeds the bounds of inde-
pendent advocacy and constitutes coordination in cases involving des-
ignated foreign terrorist organizations under § 2339B.188 In other 
words, the government claimed that it does not need to prove coordi-
nation with terrorists in proving provision of material support to terror-
ists under § 2339A.189 
                                                                                                                      
180 See Government’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Portions of Counts One Through 
Three of the Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 26, at 21–23. 
181 See Def.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of His Mot. to Dismiss Portions of Counts One 
Through Three of the Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 162, at 11–12. 
182 Charging Conference at 25, Mehanna, No. 09-10017-GAO (D. Mass. 2011); Tran-
script of Record at 35-24, Mehanna, No. 09-10017-GAO (D. Mass. 2011). 
183 Transcript of Record, supra note 182, at 35-24. 
184 Id. 
185 Charging Conference, supra note 182, at 25. 
186 See id.; Transcript of Record, supra note 182, at 35-24. 
187 See Government’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Portions of Counts One Through 
Three of the Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 26, at 23. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. In 2010 in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (HLP), the U.S. Supreme Court in-
troduced the notion of coordination for material support for terror cases involving 
§ 2339B. 130 S. Ct. at 2722. The government’s argument might be valid given that § 2339A 
focuses on support to prohibited acts rather than support to certain organizations. See 
Brown, supra note 2, at 11, 28. As a result, it might be the case that HLP’s coordination 
analysis is confined to § 2339B, which focuses on contact with prohibited organizations. Id. 
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 In addition to advocating limited applicability, the government in 
Mehanna also argued that independent advocacy should be construed 
narrowly and coordination should be construed broadly in material 
support cases.190 The government asserted that an individual could 
transgress the bounds of independent advocacy and be convicted under 
the Material Support Statute without actually making direct contact with 
terrorists.191 The government also argued that even assuming it had to 
prove direct contact between Mehanna and al Qaeda, there was still ad-
equate evidence to convict him for translating propaganda.192 The gov-
ernment claimed that Mehanna had direct contact with al Qaeda be-
cause he (1) responded to al Qaeda’s public call for support and (2) 
believed that his translation would further al Qaeda’s goals.193 
 In contrast to the government, Mehanna argued that coordination 
is an essential element of all material support cases and that an individ-
ual transgresses the bounds of independent advocacy only when he is 
controlled by terrorists.194 Mehanna asserted that independent advo-
cacy of terrorists should be protected under both § 2339A and 
§ 2339B.195 Mehanna also sought to establish that an individual must be 
under the direction and control of terrorists in order to be prosecuted 
under the statute.196 Mehanna claimed that the government had to 
show a solid connection between himself and al Qaeda in order to con-
vict him, and that no such connection could be shown to exist.197 Fi-
                                                                                                                      
190 Government’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Portions of Counts One Through 
Three of the Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 26, at 19–22. 
191 Government’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Portions of Counts One Through 
Three of the Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 26, at 22. The government 
claimed that the Court in HLP “said Section 2339B ‘avoid[s] any restriction on independ-
ent advocacy, or indeed any activities not directed to, coordinated with, or controlled by for-
eign terrorist groups.’” Id. (quoting HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2728). The government claimed 
that an individual who believes he is an active participant in al Qaeda and delivered sup-
port in the form of speech could be convicted under the Material Support Statute. Id. at 
21–22. 
192 Id. at 22. 
193 Id. The government pointed to public calls for support by al Qaeda leaders Osama 
bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri and Mehanna’s online collaboration with other indi-
viduals hoping to advance al Qaeda’s goals. Id. at 23. The government also claimed that 
Mehanna and his alleged co-conspirators could be convicted for conspiracy to provide 
material support solely on account of “the intent and understanding of the conspirators.” 
Id. at 20. 
194 Def.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of His Mot. to Dismiss Portions of Counts One 
Through Three of the Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 162, at 6, 11–12. 
195 See id. at 6 (Mehanna asserted that independent advocacy is protected by the First 
Amendment in all cases). 
196 Id. at 11–12. 
197 Id. 
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nally, Mehanna argued that even if he did interact with individuals who 
supported al Qaeda over the Internet, no evidence existed that could 
prove that these individuals were actual members of the organiza-
tion.198 Because Mehanna was convicted under both § 2339A and 
§ 2339B, it is clear that the jury found sufficient evidence to convict 
Mehanna of coordinating with or being at the direction of al Qaeda.199 
 The court in Mehanna refused to allow the incitement standard to 
be applied to the case, continuing the Supreme Court’s deference to 
the political branches.200 Mehanna requested that the Court instruct 
the jury on the incitement standard to determine if his speech was con-
stitutionally protected.201 The court in Mehanna stated that the First 
Amendment was accommodated because the statute only punished 
speech done in coordination with or at the direction of a terror organi-
zation.202 In 2010 in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (HLP), the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled that it would defer to the government’s finding 
that any provision of material support through speech to a terror or-
ganization would not be protected, and the Mehanna court’s refusal to 
instruct the jury on the First Amendment reflects this holding.203 The 
court in Mehanna did not distinguish Mehanna’s speech, which called 
for violent action, from the speech in HLP, which did not involve a call 
for violent action.204 Had the court in Mehanna instructed the jury on 
the incitement standard, it would have represented a more assertive 
protection of First Amendment rights than the approach used by the 
Court in HLP; rather than deferring to the government’s claim that all 
coordinated speech made in support of a foreign terrorist organization 
constitutes punishable material support, the court could have asserted 
its own judgment as to whether Mehanna’s speech rose to the level of 
incitement and should have been punished accordingly.205 
 The government and defense in Mehanna provide two different 
interpretations of the incitement standard as applied to Mehanna’s 
                                                                                                                      
198 Id. at 12. 
199 Rowland, supra note 1. 
200 See Charging Conference, supra note 182, at 26; Transcript of Record, supra note 
182, at 35-24. 
201 Def.’s Mot. for Preliminary Instruction to the Jury, supra note 26, at 3; see supra 
notes 64–73. 
202 See Charging Conference, supra note 182, at 26; Transcript of Record, supra note 
182, at 35-24. 
203 HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2724–2725. 
204 Id. at 2716; Transcript of Record, supra note 182, at 35-24. 
205 See HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2724–2725; Transcript of Record, supra note 182, at 35-24. 
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speech.206 The government claimed that the incitement standard set 
out by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio in 1969 was inap-
plicable because conspiracy and provision of material support are crim-
inal acts which only incidentally involve speech.207 The government 
also argued that even if Brandenburg did apply, Mehanna could still be 
found guilty under that standard.208 In contrast, Mehanna claimed that 
his speech did not constitute incitement under Brandenburg.209 Me-
hanna first claimed that his translations of propaganda were not in-
tended to incite immediate lawless action.210 Mehanna then argued 
that even if his speech did qualify as advocacy of violence under the 
first prong of Brandenburg, there was no evidence to show that his trans-
lations and conversations with other al Qaeda supporters led to or 
would be likely to result in imminent unlawful activity.211 
B. Material Support: Independent Advocacy v. Coordination and  
the Need for Defined Standards 
 The lack of definition of key terms in the Material Support Statute 
was apparent throughout Mehanna’s trial, and the crucial dividing line 
between independent advocacy and coordination remains unresolved 
for speech in material support cases.212 The distinction is important be-
cause speech constituting independent advocacy is protected under the 
First Amendment whereas speech constituting coordination with a ter-
ror organization is not.213 In HLP, the Supreme Court’s failure to define 
the terms may have chilled speech that should be constitutionally pro-
                                                                                                                      
206 Government’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Portions of Counts One Through 
Three of the Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 26, at 16–17; Def.’s Mem. of Law 
in Supp. of His Mot. to Dismiss Portions of Counts One Through Three of the Second 
Superseding Indictment, supra note 162, at 6. 
207 Government’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Portions of Counts One Through 
Three of the Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 26, at 16–17. 
208 Government’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Portions of Counts One Through 
Three of the Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 26, at 17. The government 
claimed that “[i]f Brandenburg were to apply, the defendant’s intentions and efforts to sup-
port a designated FTO recruit other individuals would satisfy the stringent standard.” Id. 
209 Def.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of His Mot. to Dismiss Portions of Counts One 
Through Three of the Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 162, at 6. 
210 Def.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of His Mot. to Dismiss Portions of Counts One 
Through Three of the Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 162, at 14–15. Me-
hanna claimed that his translation of 39 Ways “provides many suggestions as to how a Mus-
lim may participate in defending his faith without joining a fighting force.” Id. at 15. 
211 Id. 
212 See infra notes 218–250 and accompanying text. 
213 See infra notes 218–250 and accompanying text. 
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tected.214 The Court’s failure to define key terms means that lower 
courts and others interpreting the language in HLP may be confused as 
to what standards should be applied in material support cases.215 This 
confusion is reflected in Mehanna, where the defendant and the gov-
ernment advanced substantially different standards as to what the terms 
set out in HLP mean.216 Finally, courts must define terms used to prose-
cute speech under the Material Support Statute in order to provide cer-
tainty for potential speakers and ensure that legitimate speech is not 
restricted.217 
1. Independent Advocacy and Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project 
 In HLP, the Supreme Court stated that independent advocacy of a 
terrorist organization is protected by the First Amendment, but did not 
define what sort of speech would constitute independent advocacy.218 
As a result, lower courts ruling on whether a defendant’s speech consti-
tutes independent advocacy or coordination with a terrorist organiza-
tion lack guidance on how to apply these terms.219 
 Although the Court did not explicitly define independent advo-
cacy, it offered some factors to assist future courts in making this de-
termination.220 In ruling that independent advocacy cannot be pun-
ished under the Material Support Statute, the Court based its decision 
on statutory language and construction.221 Furthermore, the Court 
                                                                                                                      
 
214 See infra notes 218–229 and accompanying text. 
215 See infra notes 230–241 and accompanying text. 
216 See infra notes 230–241 and accompanying text. 
217 See infra notes 242–250 and accompanying text. 
218 See 130 S. Ct. at 2721, 2723, 2726. 
219 See id. at 2721–22. The lack of defined standards has resulted in lower courts having 
to set the parameters for determining “coordination.” See Brown, supra note 2, at 24. In 
2011 in United States v. Farhane, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld 
the conviction of a defendant physician under § 2339B for taking an oath of allegiance to 
al Qaeda. 634 F.3d 127, 132–34, 150 (2d Cir. 2011). 
220 HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2721–22, 2723, 2726, 2728. 
221 Id. at 2721–22. Section 2339B(g)(4) states that the term “material support or re-
sources” has the same definition as in § 2339A. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006). Section 2339A 
defines “material support or resources” as including “personnel.” Id. § 2339A. Section 
2339B(h) then states that in connection with provision of personnel, “[i]ndividuals who 
act entirely independently of the foreign terrorist organization to advance its goals or ob-
jectives shall not be considered to be working under the foreign terrorist organization’s 
direction or control.” Id. § 2339B. The HLP Court then held that “service,” also part of 
§ 2339A’s definition of “material support or resources,” could only be provided in connec-
tion with a foreign terrorist organization and thus could not include independent advo-
cacy. 130 S. Ct. at 2721–22. Finally, the court noted that “the other types of material sup-
port listed in the statute, including ‘lodging,’ ‘weapons,’ ‘explosives,’ and ‘transportation’ 
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said that individuals advocating for terrorist organizations, speaking 
about terrorist organizations or becoming members of terrorist organi-
zations will be free from prosecution under the statute so long as these 
activities are done independently of terrorists or terror organiza-
tions.222 The Court stated that speech coordinated with or under the 
direction of terrorist groups could be prosecuted under the Material 
Support Statute.223 The Court later stated that the Material Support 
Statute only restricts activities “directed to, coordinated with, or con-
trolled by foreign terrorist groups.”224 
                                                                                                                     
 Although the Court stated that independent advocacy was allowed 
under the Material Support Statute whereas coordination and “direc-
tion” were not, the Court did not provide definitions for these terms.225 
Indeed, the Court indicated that it is committed to deciding cases in-
volving the Material Support Statute on a case-by-case basis.226 The 
Court noted that plaintiff Humanitarian Law Project’s reply brief raised 
questions as to how much coordination or direction is required to con-
stitute “service” to terrorism, but dismissed the questions as “entirely 
hypothetical.”227 The Court also refused to rule on whether plaintiff’s 
proposed political advocacy for the terrorist organizations would violate 
the statute because the plaintiff did not specify its level of coordina-
tion.228 The absence of standards for independent advocacy and coor-
dination fully informed the Mehanna case, as both Mehanna and the 
government sought to advance different standards for what these terms 
entail.229 
 
are not forms of support that could be provided independently of a foreign terrorist or-
ganization.” Id. at 2722 (citation omitted). 
222 HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2723. 
223 Id. 
224 Id. at 2728. 
225 See id. at 2723. 
226 See id. at 2722, 2729. 
227 Id. at 2722. 
228 HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2729. 
229 See Government’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Portions of Counts One Through 
Three of the Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 26, at 21–23 (seeking to define 
“coordination” broadly and to ensure that it is only applicable in a limited number of ma-
terial support cases); Def.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of His Mot. to Dismiss Portions of 
Counts One Through Three of the Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 162, at 11–
12 (attempting to establish that coordination existed only in situations where a terror or-
ganization exerted direct control over an actor and that coordination is a necessary ele-
ment of all material support cases). 
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2. Independent Advocacy, Material Support and United States v. 
Mehanna 
 In evaluating both the Material Support Statute and the Court’s 
decision in HLP, an argument can be made that coordination must be 
proved for liability under both § 2339A and § 2339B.230 Although the 
Court’s opinion in HLP involves only § 2339B, it is crucial to note that 
§ 2339B(g)(4) states that § 2339B’s definition of “material support” is 
identical to the definition provided in § 2339A.231 Furthermore, the 
Court noted in HLP that the forms of support listed in § 2339A’s defini-
tion of material support are forms that by their very nature could not be 
provided independently of a terrorist organization.232 Given the statu-
tory language and the Court’s opinion, it is reasonable to assume that 
individuals engaging in independent advocacy should be free from 
prosecution and that coordination with terrorists is necessary for con-
viction under the entirety of the Material Support Statute.233 
 Given the Court’s decision in HLP, it is difficult to believe that an 
individual could exceed the bounds of independent advocacy without 
making contact with terrorists.234 The Court in HLP stated that an indi-
vidual could join a designated foreign terrorist organization while in-
dependently advocating for the group’s cause and still escape prosecu-
tion under the Material Support Statute.235 This casts doubt on the 
government’s claim that Mehanna could be convicted because he be-
lieved he was a member of al Qaeda and provided translations in sup-
port.236 The government’s claim that Mehanna had direct contact with 
al Qaeda is also dubious.237 The government did not allege that Me-
hanna had any direct connection with any members of al Qaeda, and 
the Court previously stated in HLP that the Material Support Statute 
                                                                                                                      
230 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B (2006); HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2721–22. 
231 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B. 
232 HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2721–22; see supra note 129 (quoting the pertinent portion of 
§ 2339A). 
233 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B; HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2721–22. 
234 See HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2723. 
235 Id. 
236 See id.; Government’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Portions of Counts One 
Through Three of the Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 26, at 21–22. 
237 HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2722; Government’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Portions of 
Counts One Through Three of the Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 26, at 22 
(“[T]he evidence at trial will show at least that the defendant (a) believed that he was re-
sponding to a public call of Al Qa'ida for specific types of assistance, and (b) the defendant 
and his co-conspirators believed that their assistance would be consumed by and suppor-
tive to Al Qa'ida, Al Qa'ida operatives and would-be Al Qa'ida recruits. Each of these ave-
nues constitute direct one-way contact between the conspirators and the FTO.”). 
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exclusively lists forms of support that require being “connected” to ter-
rorists or a terror organization.238 
 If the government’s attenuated form of contact between Mehanna 
and al Qaeda is ultimately legitimized by the Court then the Material 
Support Statute could lead to even further restrictions on the right to 
free speech.239 The government would likely attempt to prosecute even 
more attenuated forms of contact in subsequent cases, which could 
chill legitimate speech critical of the government’s war effort.240 Decid-
ing what degree of contact is necessary to convict an individual for pro-
viding material support through speech presents the traditional di-
lemma courts face during wartime: whether to uphold civil liberties 
and potentially hinder the government’s war effort or defer to the gov-
ernment and allow civil liberties to be eroded.241 
3. The Need for Defined Standards and the Impact of United States v. 
Mehanna 
 As illustrated by Mehanna, it is essential that courts develop defined 
standards for terms such as independent advocacy and coordination.242 
Courts also must clarify whether these terms apply to both § 2339A and 
§ 2339B or exclusively to § 2339B for material support to a designated 
foreign terrorist organization.243 In the absence of clearly defined stan-
                                                                                                                      
238 18 U.S.C. § 2339B; HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2722. The Court stated that “The statute pro-
hibits providing service ‘to a foreign terrorist organization.’ The use of the word ‘to’ indi-
cates a connection between the service and the foreign group.” HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2721–22 
(citation omitted). 
239 See HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2721–22. 
240 Brown, supra note 3; see HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2721–22. Mehanna’s conviction might 
prompt the government to push the envelope even further in seeking to prevent the de-
velopment of terrorists. Brown, supra note 2, at 20. 
241 See Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 291, 300 (1961) (protecting civil liberties 
during the Cold War); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 516–17 (1951) (deferring to 
the government’s curtailment of civil liberties during the Cold War); Schenck v. United 
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (deferring to the government’s curtailment of civil liberties 
during World War I). 
242 See HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2721, 2726; Government’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 
Portions of Counts One Through Three of the Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 
26, at 21–23; Def.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of His Mot. to Dismiss Portions of Counts One 
Through Three of the Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 162, at 11–12. 
243 See HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2721–22; Government’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Por-
tions of Counts One Through Three of the Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 26, 
at 23; Def.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of His Mot. to Dismiss Portions of Counts One Through 
Three of the Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 162, at 6. Section 2339B prohib-
its support to organizations defined as foreign terrorist organizations, whereas § 2339A 
does not require support of a designated foreign terrorist organization for a violator to be 
prosecuted. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B. 
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dards, the prosecution and defense in material support cases will likely 
continue to put forth wildly divergent interpretations as to what these 
terms mean and to which parts of the Material Support Statute they 
should apply.244 This uncertainty could result in individuals refraining 
from legitimate speech for fear of being prosecuted under the Material 
Support Statute.245 
 It is unclear how Mehanna’s conviction under the Material Sup-
port Statute will impact future interpretations of the meaning and cov-
erage of independent advocacy and coordination.246 If the appellate 
court defers to the government’s interpretation of the scope of the 
HLP Court’s analysis, then independent advocacy and coordination will 
only be factored into cases involving § 2339B.247 This would mean that 
an individual could be convicted of providing material support to ter-
rorists under § 2339A without actually having been in contact with ter-
rorists.248 
 Similarly, if the government’s broad definition of coordination and 
independent advocacy are accorded deference, then an individual 
could be convicted for material support because he believed speech in 
favor of a terror organization’s goals would satisfy an organization’s 
public call for support.249 Convicting an individual for such a reason 
could lead the government dangerously close to prosecuting individu-
als because of their ideas rather than because the individuals have actu-
ally aided the war effort of the government’s enemies.250 
C. Incitement and Material Support Cases 
 The Brandenburg standard for incitement speech may not be com-
patible with cases brought under the Material Support Statute; there-
fore, a new standard for incitement should be developed for the stat-
ute.251 The Supreme Court’s use of strict scrutiny in HLP makes it clear 
that advocacy for terror organizations should be treated as speech when 
                                                                                                                      
244 See HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2721, 2726; Government’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 
Portions of Counts One Through Three of the Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 
26, at 21–23; Def.’s Mem. of Law in Supp. of His Mot. to Dismiss Portions of Counts One 
Through Three of the Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 162, at 11–12. 
245 See HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2728. 
246 See supra notes 230–241 and accompanying text. 
247 See supra notes 190–199 and accompanying text. 
248 See supra notes 190–199 and accompanying text. 
249 See supra notes 234–241 and accompanying text. 
250 See Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 207, 210 (1919) (deferring to the gov-
ernment’s conviction of an individual for praising Germany during World War I). 
251 See infra notes 255–323 and accompanying text. 
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prosecuted under the Material Support Statute, meaning that the Bran-
denburg standard can be properly applied to cases such as Mehanna.252 
Whether Mehanna’s speech would be protected under the Brandenburg 
incitement standard remains unclear.253 Finally, modern terrorism ren-
ders Brandenburg inapplicable to the Material Support Statute, meaning 
that a new standard for incitement under material support cases should 
be developed.254 
1. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project: Clues for the Incitement 
Standard? 
 Although Brandenburg’s incitement standard appears nowhere in 
HLP, a portion of the HLP opinion may inform future applications of 
the incitement standard in material support cases.255 The relevant sec-
tion of HLP involves the Court’s assertion that the Material Support 
Statute’s ban on speech constituting material support operated as a 
content-based restriction on speech.256 The Court held that the speech 
that resulted in § 2339B’s application arose directly from the commu-
nication of a message providing material support to a terror organiza-
tion.257 This casts doubt on the government’s argument that Mehanna 
was charged on the basis of dangerous conduct which incidentally bur-
dened speech as opposed to the speech itself.258 In other words, HLP’s 
precedent means that any restriction on Mehanna’s speech arises be-
cause the content of Mehanna’s speech allegedly resulted in material 
support to al Qaeda.259 As a result, communication like Mehanna’s 
translations should be evaluated as speech instead of conduct, and the 
Brandenburg standard can be properly applied to such a case.260 
 Although the Brandenburg standard was not applied in HLP, the 
omission of the test can be explained by the message which plaintiff 
                                                                                                                      
252 See infra notes 255–272 and accompanying text. 
253 See infra notes 273–281 and accompanying text. 
254 See infra notes 282–323 and accompanying text. 
255 See HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2723–24; Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); su-
pra notes 64–73 and accompanying text (outlining the Brandenburg standard). The HLP 
Court had no need to address the incitement standard, as plaintiffs in that case did not 
wish to incite the terrorist groups to violence, but instead wished to provide political and 
humanitarian support. HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2733 (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
256 HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2723–24. 
257 Id. at 2724. 
258 See id; Government’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Portions of Counts One 
Through Three of the Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 26, at 20–21. 
259 HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2723–24. 
260 See id. at 2724; Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
2013] Mehanna, the 1st Amendment, and Material Support in the War on Terror 743 
Humanitarian Law Project sought to communicate.261 The plaintiff in 
HLP did not seek to incite others to violence through speech, but in-
stead sought to communicate with foreign terrorist organizations for 
peaceable purposes.262 The plaintiff was threatened with prosecution 
under § 2339B under the theory that any training or expert advice re-
sulted in material support to a terror organization, regardless of the 
underlying purpose of the message.263 Mehanna represents a case where 
the incitement standard could be properly applied, as the defendant in 
that case arguably used speech in an effort to incite others to violent 
acts for the furtherance of al Qaeda.264 Using the incitement standard 
to determine whether speech like Mehanna’s is constitutionally pro-
tected would represent a more assertive protection of free speech 
rights.265 The incitement standard would allow a court to specifically 
determine whether Mehanna’s speech or the speech of a similarly situ-
ated defendant actually contributed to a terror organization, and would 
also allow a court to avoid the nebulous coordination and independent 
advocacy tests and assert their own judgment as to whether Mehanna 
had sufficiently aligned himself with al Qaeda to the point that he de-
serves criminal punishment.266 
 Given that communication like Mehanna’s translations should be 
evaluated as speech instead of conduct, his conviction, and the convic-
tion of those similarly situated, could be subject to either the strict scru-
tiny standard or the incitement standard.267 Treating communication 
like Mehanna’s translations as speech rather than conduct may also 
                                                                                                                      
261 See HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2716. 
262 Id. 
263 Id. at 2724. 
264 See Government’s Proffer and Mem. in Supp. of Detention, supra note 173, at 64–66. 
265 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
266 See id. Using the incitement standard would bypass the Court’s ruling in HLP that 
all speech coordinated with a foreign terror organization under Section 2339B lacks con-
stitutional protection. HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2724–25. The Court found that 2339B satisfied 
strict scrutiny and operated as a legitimate restriction of speech. Id. at 2724–25, 2728. 
However, some speech restrictions may be unconstitutional under the Brandenburg incite-
ment standard even though they satisfy strict scrutiny. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, 
Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2417, 2452 (1996) 
(“The answer must be that strict scrutiny is in certain cases preempted, so to speak, by the 
‘theory of our Constitution’ as expressed in cases such as Brandenburg-—that, as I suggest 
above, some speech restrictions are unconstitutional under Brandenburg even though 
they are narrowly tailored to a compelling interest.”). Evaluating the case under Branden-
burg would allow a court to bypass the Court’s mode of analysis in HLP and avoid the neb-
ulous “coordination” and “independent advocacy” tests. See HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2723; Bran-
denburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
267 HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2723–24; supra notes 48–73 and accompanying text. 
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help to establish the precedent that speech prosecuted under the Ma-
terial Support Statute will be subject to strict scrutiny.268 This is a wel-
come step, as it may help to preserve free speech rights in the midst of 
the War on Terror, a conflict which the government plans to fight over 
an undefined period of time.269 Alternately, the incitement standard 
may provide the government with another test for evaluating speech in 
material support cases.270 Rather than overcoming the rigorous strict 
scrutiny standard, the government may instead try to show that the 
speech in question is not constitutionally protected under Branden-
burg.271 As will be illustrated, however, the Brandenburg incitement stan-
dard may not be easily applicable to material support cases.272 
2. Incitement and United States v. Mehanna 
 It is unclear whether Mehanna’s speech would be protected by the 
First Amendment under the incitement standard, which protects advo-
cacy of violence or breaking the law unless (1) the advocacy is made to 
incite immediate unlawful activity, and (2) the speech is likely to incite 
unlawful activity.273 It is certainly reasonable to assume that Mehanna’s 
speech could be found to satisfy the first prong of the incitement stan-
dard because it was intended to produce imminent lawless action.274 
Mehanna’s translated version of 39 Ways praised jihad and urged Mus-
lims to follow the mujahidin.275 It is also clear that Mehanna made 
online comments to fellow supporters that he hoped his translations 
would lead to action and “increase . . . [al Qaeda] membership a bil-
lionfold.”276 
                                                                                                                      
268 See HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2723–24. 
269 Hafetz, supra note 10, at 374; Miller, supra note 10. 
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273 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447; Government’s Proffer and Mem. in Supp. of De-
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274 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447; Government’s Proffer and Mem. in Supp. of De-
tention, supra note 173, at 66. 
275 Government’s Proffer and Mem. in Supp. of Detention, supra note 173, at 66. The 
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Joshua E. Keating, Loss of Inspiration, Foreign Policy (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.foreign 
policy.com/articles/2011/09/30/loss_of_inspiration. As previously discussed, Mehanna 
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and accompanying text. 
276 Second Superseding Indictment, supra note 3, at 6–7. 
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 Whether Mehanna’s translations were likely to result in imminent 
violent action and satisfied the second prong of Brandenburg is a more 
difficult question.277 As previously discussed, actual proof of violence 
resulting from speech can be used to show that the speech qualified as 
incitement.278 Although a lack of violence would not automatically pre-
clude a finding of incitement speech, Mehanna would have some 
grounds for claiming that his activity does not fall under the second 
prong of Brandenburg.279 On the other hand, the government could 
point to the potential for supporters to be galvanized by online speech 
to support its case that Mehanna’s translations fall under Brandenburg’s 
second prong.280 Whether the translations would be likely to result in 
imminent violent action, however, seems to be entirely unclear.281 
3. Is Brandenburg Compatible with Material Support Cases? 
 It is not clear that the incitement standard in Brandenburg is com-
patible with the government’s preventative approach to fighting terror-
ism.282 The U.S. government fights terrorism with the view that terror-
ism must be prevented before it occurs, and that the traditional process 
of apprehending and punishing after the fact will not succeed against 
modern terrorists.283 The government’s means of fighting contempo-
                                                                                                                      
277 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
278 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928–29 (1982) (holding that vio-
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281 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
282 See id.; Shanor, supra note 88, at 592. 
283 See Shanor, supra note 88, at 592; Brown, supra note 3; supra notes 93–102 and ac-
companying text. 
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rary terrorists, therefore, is far different than the government’s meth-
ods of punishing traditional criminals.284 
 The Brandenburg standard, developed by the Supreme Court in 
1969, almost certainly did not envision the preemptive law enforcement 
methods employed against the modern terrorists.285 The standard that 
incitement speech must be “likely to incite” imminent lawless action 
may not be compatible with the government’s current approach to 
fighting terrorism.286 For one thing, it is difficult to reconcile the “likely 
to incite” portion of the Brandenburg standard with the government’s 
concern about online speech.287 For example, thousands of individuals 
may view Mehanna’s work and be unmoved.288 Nevertheless, merely 
one individual out of potentially thousands of viewers who decides to 
carry out a terrorist attack as a result of online propaganda has the po-
tential to cause great damage.289 Whether terrorism is “likely” to occur 
in such a situation is a difficult question to answer given the hypotheti-
cal numbers, though the stakes involved in a potentially successful ter-
ror attack are enormous.290 Additionally, the sort of violence envisioned 
by the incitement standard may be far different than the violence at 
stake in terrorism cases, where thousands of people might die in a sin-
gle attack.291 Furthermore, a terrorist sympathizer who is fanatical 
enough to die for his cause may be far more likely to act as a result of 
speech than the sort of criminal envisioned by the Brandenburg stan-
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285 See 395 U.S. at 447. 
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dard.292 Brandenburg’s imminence requirement also precludes finding 
incitement when violence occurs weeks or months after speech advo-
cating violence.293 This may not be compatible with the realities of 
modern terrorism, where attacks are often carefully plotted over a span 
of weeks or months.294 Finally, the after-the-fact analysis used to evalu-
ate incitement in Claiborne may not be useful with regards to modern 
terrorism, where the goal is to prevent violence from occurring in the 
first place.295 
                                                                                                                     
 The difficulty in applying Brandenburg to the government’s pre-
emptive approach makes future applications of the incitement standard 
to material support cases uncertain.296 On the one hand, the incite-
ment standard may not be applicable to the Material Support Statute, 
which functions as a preventative measure to punish support for poten-
tial terrorist attacks.297 On the other hand, it is also crucial that courts 
vigorously defend civil liberties during wartime.298 To reconcile these 
two crucial considerations, it would be helpful for courts to develop a 
new incitement standard to be used for speech prosecuted under the 
Material Support Statute.299 
 A standard for incitement in material support cases should declare 
advocacy for terrorism to be constitutionally protected under the First 
Amendment unless (1) the speaker has made proven contact with a 
member of a terrorist organization as defined by § 2339B, (2) the 
speaker spoke in support of terror after this contact was made, and (3) 
the advocacy was made to incite others to provide material support or 
resources to a terrorist organization as set out in § 2339B or to incite 
others to provide material support or resources for the commission of a 
crime as set out in § 2339A.300 This incitement standard for material 
support accommodates the government’s interest in fighting terror 
while also protecting the right to free speech.301 It also provides a court 
that may be hesitant to apply the Brandenburg standard with an alter-
nate approach to cases involving incitement.302 Accordingly, courts may 
 
292 See Shanor, supra note 88, at 592; Brown, supra note 3. 
293 Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 928. 
294 See Tamanaha, supra note 113, at 433. 
295 See 458 U.S. at, 928–29; Shanor, supra note 88, at 592; Brown, supra note 3. 
296 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447; Shanor, supra note 88, at 592; Brown, supra note 3. 
297 See HLP, 130 S. Ct. at 2728. 
298 See id. at 2727. 
299 See infra notes 300–323 and accompanying text. 
300 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
301 See infra notes 304–323 and accompanying text. 
302 See Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447. 
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be more willing to engage in meaningful First Amendment analysis ra-
ther than deferring to the government in material support cases and 
allowing civil liberties to erode.303 
 The incitement standard for material support cases proposed above 
allows the government to continue fighting terror through preemptive 
means while also safeguarding free speech rights.304 Part (1) of the stan-
dard requires the government to show that a defendant made contact 
with a member of a terrorist organization as defined by § 2339B.305 The 
standard should also take into account contact made with members of a 
banned terrorist organization when made through intermediaries, 
which is an especially important consideration in light of the increas-
ingly decentralized nature of al Qaeda.306 By requiring the government 
to show actual contact with terrorists, speakers who have not made con-
tact of this sort can speak freely without worrying that the government 
can bring claims against them.307 
 Part (2) of the standard requires the government to show that the 
speaker spoke in support of terror after contact with a terrorist organi-
zation was made, which means that the government must show that ter-
rorist advocacy is linked with the contact.308 By requiring the govern-
ment to show that the speaker made contact with a banned terrorist 
organization, the government also bears the burden of showing that 
the speaker advocated for unlawful violence after some form of coordi-
nation with a terror organization.309 
 Collectively, parts (1) and (2) of the standard help to guarantee 
free speech rights by requiring the government to prove that a speaker 
worked in coordination with terrorists and did not speak independ-
ently.310 This standard would not allow for a nebulous definition of co-
ordination, meaning that a speaker would be required to actually speak 
or meet with a member of a banned terror organization rather than 
merely responding to a public call to action.311 This standard furthers 
the HLP Court’s overwhelming concern for preventing coordination 
with terrorist organizations is furthered as a result of this standard.312 
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 Part (3) of the proposed standard removes the Brandenburg re-
quirement that the speaker advocates for imminent unlawful activity.313 
Instead, the speaker must advocate for others to commit acts which 
would be punishable under § 2339A and § 2339B.314 This allows the 
government to punish advocacy for terrorist violence in a preemptive 
manner rather than having to prove that the violence is “imminently” 
forthcoming.315 
 If the proposed standard were to be applied to the Mehanna case, 
it is likely that Mehanna would not be found to have committed in-
citement, and therefore, the First Amendment would protect him.316 
Mehanna’s conduct would likely be found to have satisfied the third 
prong of advocating to incite others to provide material support or re-
sources to a terror organization banned by § 2339B.317 As previously 
discussed, Mehanna stated that he translated works in the hope that it 
would lead to increased membership in al Qaeda.318 Nevertheless, it is 
unlikely that the government could prove under the first prong of the 
proposed test that Mehanna made proven contact with a member of a 
terrorist organization as defined in § 2339B.319 The government had 
no evidence that Mehanna made contact with members of al Qaeda.320 
Indeed, the closest the government had to direct contact was a request 
by al Qaeda to Tibyan asking for Mehanna to complete a translation.321 
Nevertheless, there is no evidence that Mehanna ever responded back 
to this inquiry, or followed up on it by translating work as a result.322 
Finding that Mehanna would not be guilty of incitement would set the 
precedent that the government cannot prosecute a defendant for 
speech in material support cases unless the defendant worked directly 
with terrorists and would further protect First Amendment freedoms 
during war time.323 
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Conclusion 
 United States v. Mehanna raises important issues with regards to the 
future of free speech in the War on Terror. The case could be crucial in 
determining the degree of protection that speech made in support of 
terrorist organizations will receive under the First Amendment. This 
Note argues that courts must develop more defined standards for the 
prosecution of speech under the Material Support Statute. The Note 
also proposes a new incitement standard for speech prosecuted under 
the Material Support Statute. Hopefully the standards developed here 
will help to preserve free speech rights while also allowing the govern-
ment to combat terrorism. 
Nikolas Abel 
